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The Rise and Fall of Roth-
A Critique of the Recent
Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions
By Herald Price Fahringer* and Michael 1. Brown**
I. hInRODUCTION
On June 21, 1973, five members of the United States Supreme
Court suddenly overturned the whole body of law governing
obscenity prosecutions.' Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall stood by and watched helplessly the collapse of this
carefully constructed regime of law they had played an important
part in developing.
The majority concluded that the community standards used
to judge a work should be "local" rather than "nationar' and
that no expert advice was needed to prove a book or film's
obscene character. The requirement that a work be "utterly
without redeeming social value" was renounced; rather, it must
now have "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"
to escape censure. In writing this most chilling chapter in first
amendment history, the Court again rejected the right of con-
senting adults to privately read or see what they please.
The Court, in a bold but potentially dangerous experiment,
concluded that the subject of obscenity must be calibrated by
precise statutes which particularly describe the form of sexual
depiction sought to be suppressed. In order to place in proper
perspective these dramatic changes in the law of obscenity a
short discussion of its legal history is required.
0 B.A., M.A. 1950, Pennsylvania State University- J.D. 1956, University of
Buffalo; partner, Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Schufler & James; practicing in
Buffalo and New York City; General Counsel to First Amendment Lawyers Associa-tion.tion. .B.S. 1965, Canisius College; J.D. 1969 State University of New York at
Buffalo; partner, Aps itz, Green, Falringer, Roll Schuller & James.
I Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 139 (1973J; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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II. TEE ADVENT OF Roth
Until 1957 the subject of obscenity had received relatively
little attention from the United States Supreme Court.2 However,
in that year United States v. Roth3 appeared on the Supreme
Court's docket. The man who lent his name to this litigation
was an experienced dealer in erotica in New York City. Roth
was convicted of sending books called Good Times, A Review
of the World of Pleasure and a quarterly called American Aphro-
dite through the mails. The Second Circuit affirmed his convic-
tion.4
The Supreme Court sustained Roth's conviction, concluding
that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press,"5 and then forged the test which would be used
for the next decade in measuring obscenity. That formula was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to the prurient interest."6 Thus Roth became the
landmark case, the progenitor of all the law produced in this
legal realm.
Some legal scholars mistakenly feared this test was too
vague and would invite severe censorship.' But in the shadow
of Roth, the Court, in a series of per curiam decisions, overturned
lower court decisions finding obscene the motion picture The
2 Under the old English common law, the distribution of obscene material was
only illegal if it attacked organized religion. It was not until 1868 in Great Britain
that a test for obscenity was adopted by the courts, which was subsequently used
in the United States. In Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, the first legal
yardstick for measuring obscenity was carved out of the common law. The
Hicklin test, as it came to be known, p rovided "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." Id.
at 369.
3 354 U.S. 476 (1957). At the same time, the case of People v. Alberts, 292
P.2d 90 (Cal. 1955), reached the Court involving a California conviction for the
distribution of obscene materials which had no literary pretentions whatsoever. A
large part of the materials distributed by Alberts were sado-masochistic photo-
graphs popularly known as bondage pictures. But, by a strange quirk of fate, it
was Roth's name that became identified with the Court's newly devised obscenity
test.
4 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
5 354 U.S. at 485.
6 Id. at 489.
7 Comment, Constitutional Protection of Obscene Material Against Censorship
as Correlated with Copyright Protection of Obscene Material Against Infringement,
31 So. CAL. L. RFv. 301, 306 (1958). See also 1957 DEPAtrL L. B. v. 111, 113
gnd 60 W. VA. L. REv. 89 (1957).
[VoL 62
OBScEN=r DECISIONS
Game of Love;8 a book called One-The Homosexual Magazine;9
two nudist magazines entitled Sunshine and Health and Sun;10
and an imported collection of student art publications." In each
of these significant per curiam opinions the Court merely cited
Roth. The next year the Court, on procedural grounds, upset
New York's assessment of Lady Chatterly's Lover as obscene.' 2
During the next seven years, the battlelines drawn across the
first amendment became quiet with only sporadic fighting until
1966 when the famous trilogy of Ginzburg, Mishkin and Fanny
Hill reached the Supreme Court." However, two significant
cases had broken the ten-year truce that followed Roth.
In Smith v. California'4 the Court decided that proof of
scienter was a required constitutional predicate to any obscenity
conviction. And in Jacobellis v. Ohio"5 the Court, in a plurality
opinion held that a national community standard should apply
to state and federal obscenity prosecutions. As a consequence, the
conviction of the French film Les Amants (The Lovers) was re-
versed.
III. THEi RTSE OF Roth
Roth reigned supreme for a decade and, as we have seen, was
used by the Court to strike down a number of obscenity convic-
tions. However, on March 21, 1966, the Court decided the cases
of Richard Ginzburg, Edward Mishkin and the book popularly
known as Fanny Hill.'6 The Court affirmed the convictions of
8 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, rev'g 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957).
9 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), rev'g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957).
1 Sunshine Book Company v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), rev'g 249
F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
11 Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, rev'g 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957).
12 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
13 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966); and A Book Named "John Clelands Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
14 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
15 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
16 Ralph Ginzburg who recklessly boasted of the sexual content of his pub-
lications was convicted of sending through the mail a hard-cover magazine of
ex-ensive format; Liaison, a bi-weekly newsletter; and The Housewife's Hand-
book on Selective Promiscuity, a short book. Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 466 (1966). Ginzburg had unsuccessfully sought mailing privileges for
his material from the postmasters of Intercourse and Blue Balls, Pennsylvania and
(Continued on next page)
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Ginzburg and Mishkin but reversed the Massachusetts decision
holding Fanny Hill obscene.' 7 In Ginzburg the Court smuggled
the much maligned doctrine of "pandering" into the law of
obscenity. This ill-conceived doctrine came into the strange
world of obscenity like a bastard child-half improvised and
half compromised. The Court, thereafter, understandably shunned
it and never invoked the rule again.
In Mishkin the Court decided that the prurient appeal test
was satisfied in any instance where it could be shown that a book
was designed for and disseminated to a well-defined deviant
sexual group.' 8 However, in the Fanny Hill case, the Court forti-
fied the Roth test by welding onto it the requirement that before
a book can be legally denounced it must be utterly without re-
deeming social value. The Court stressed:
... three elements must coalesce: it must be established that
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeem-
ing social value.19
The law continued in this state only until 1967. During the
short intervening period the Supreme Court docket became
clogged with a large number of obscenity cases involving a
variety of materials found obscene by trial courts and juries.
Hidden in this swarm of petitions was a little-known case en-
titled Redrup v. New York.
20
On May 8, 1967, the Court decided Redrup and reversed New
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
thereafter deposited his materials with the postmaster at Middlesex, New Jersey.
Edward Mishkin was found guilty in New York City of manufacturing and
selling a wide variety of books dealing with every conceivable form of sexual
aberration. 207 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1960), aff'd, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1962), aft'd, 204
N.E.2d 209, 255 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1964).
John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill) was found ob-
scene in a civil injunctive proceeding in Boston, Massachusetts and was affirmed
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 206 N.E.2d 403 (Mass. 1965).
17Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); and A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
18 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. at 508-09.
19 383 U.S. at 418.
20 886 U.S. 767 (1967).
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York's determination that two innocuous paperback books entitled
Lust Pool and Shame Agent were obscene.21 In Redrup, probably
the most important per curiam opinion in the history of obscenity
litigation, it was suggested that materials not pandered, sold to
minors, or foisted upon unwilling audiences were constitutionally
protected. This decision broke the logjam of Supreme Court
cases. On June 12, 1967, a tidal wave of per curiam decisions swept
down from our highest court, washing away some 15 obscenity
convictions and leaving scattered in its path a wide range of
constitutionally protected paperback novels, girlie magazines and
motion picture films. 22 Redrup became the watchword in re-
versing no fewer than 35 obscenity convictions in the following
years. This unconditional Supreme Court action led lawyers to
conclude that any publication which was not sold to a minor,
pandered or imposed upon the privacy of another, enjoyed first
amendment immunity.
Two years after Redrup, on April 7, 1969, the Supreme Court
electrified prosecutors across the nation when it reversed Robert
Stanley's conviction for possessing obscene materials in his At-
lanta home.2 Relying on Roth, the Court held that mere pos-
session of obscenity could not be made criminal.24 Stanley be-
came the Warren Court's valedictory opinion in the obscenity
field.
21 On the same day the Court reversed the cases of Austin v. Kentucky, 386
U.S. 767 (1967) and Gent v. Arkansas, 886 U.S. 767 (1967), holding a collection
of "girie" magazines not obscene.2 2 Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S.
340 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Central
Magazine Sales Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of
Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Sehackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967);
Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388
U.S. 452 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books, Inc. v.
United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Westherry, 388
U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New
York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Shepard v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert
v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratuer v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967);
Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967): Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440
(1967); Austin v. Kentucky, 386 U.S. 767 (1987); Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767
1967).
23 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24 The Court instructed:
Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the
problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in every
context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth
nor any other decision of this Court reaches that far.
Id. at 563.
-ENTucKY LAw JouNAL
Under Stanley's influence it was thought that the Court was
finally on the road to renovating and modernizing the law of
obscenity by holding sexually oriented material to be protected
speech subject only to the limited control of safeguarding minors
and those unwilling to receive it. But, as it developed, the au-
thority of Roth had crested and was receding.
IV. Tim DECLINE OF Roth
In the critical years following Roth and Redrup, the composi-
tion of the Supreme Court dramatically changed. Richard Nixon,
elected President in 1968, began making appointments to the
Court in 1969. Consequently, when the next battery of obscenity
cases was considered by the Court, Chief Justice Burger had
assumed its leadership with Justice Blackmun standing close by
his side. On May 8, 1971, the Burger Court began to withdraw
from the frontiers established by the Warren Court, rejecting the
claim that the distribution of obscenity could only be criminal
if made to minors or an unwilling audience.2 5
It had been argued, to no avail, that since a buyer of obscene
materials had the absolute right to possess them in his home, and
because no other citizen's privacy was offended, the government
had no legitimate interest in interfering with or punishing private
sales of obscenity. Justice Black, upstaging the majority's logic,
lashed back at them by stressing ". . . in the future that case
[Stanley] will be recognized as good law only when a man writes
salacious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and
reads them in his living room."26
Reidel sounded the requiem for Stanley, and it was apparent
that any further doctrinal expansion of Roth was foreclosed. All
hope of the adult American public being able to read and see
what it pleased was doomed. By 1971 Justices Powell and Rehn-
25United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. Thirty-
Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). The Court in unmistakable
language pointed out in Reidel:
The District Court gave Stanley too wide a sweep. To extrapolate from
Stanley's right to have and peruse obscene material in the privacy of his
own home a First Amendment right in Reidel to sell it to him would
effectly scuttle Roth, the precise result that the Stanley opinion ab-
jured. Whatever the scope of the "right to receive" referred to in
Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in
which Reidel engaged here-dealings which Roth held unprotected by the
the First Amendment.
402 U.S. at 355.
26402 U.S. at 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
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quist had joined the Court and had rushed to the aid of the
"Burger Block." The tide had turned, -and the decisions of June,
1973 were inevitable.
V. THE JuNE DECISIONS
On June 21, 1973, the Court announced opinions in five major
cases dealing with the substantive law of obscenity.27 Four days
later, it decided three additional cases dealing with the search
and seizure methods used in obscenity cases.28 Subsequently, the
Court remanded some 60 additional cases, either pending on
direct appeal or on certiorari petitions, for reconsideration in
light of the decisions of June 21st and June 24th. An understand-
ing of the factual background of these cases helps to place the
issues in proper perspective.
A. Miller v. California29
Marvin Miller had launched one of the largest mail order
businesses on the west coast dealing in sexually-oriented materials.
He was convicted under California's Roth-test obscenity law of
mailing unsolicited ads and sexually-oriented magazines to the
public. The trial judge instructed the jury that the challenged
publications should be assessed in the light of California's con-
temporary community standards and not a national standard. The
prosecutor produced no proof, expert or otherwise, bearing on the
issue of obscenity.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Miller became that Court's
most formidable pronouncement and dominates this collection of
cases. In Miller the Court held that a local community standard
was constitutionally adequate and that obscenity should be gov-
erned by statutes which specifically describe the types of sexual
depiction sought to be suppressed. The Court also concluded
that the state was not obliged to prove each of the elements of
obscenity by expert testimony.
B. Paris Adult Theatre F0
In the Paris Adult Theatre case the District Attorney for
27 See note 1 supra.2 8 Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
29413 U.S. 15 (1973).
30413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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Atlanta, Georgia and the state solicitor joined forces and ified
civil complaints seeking to enjoin the general exhibition of two
allegedly obscene films entitled Magic Mirror and It All Comes
Out in the End at the Paris Adult Theatre I. These actions were
initiated under a Georgia civil statute based on the Roth test.
The Atlanta trial judge dismissed the complaint on Stanley
grounds, holding that the exhibition of these films in a commercial
theater to consenting adults with the use of reasonable precautions
preventing exposure to minors was "constitutionally permissible."
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding the
film obscene.
In the Paris case the Supreme Court put to rest the claim that
consenting adults should be allowed to see what they please.3'
The Court, apparently suffering under the legacy of its puritan
forefathers, decided that the states have a right to "maintain a
decent society."
3 2
C. Kaplan v. California3
In Kaplan v. California, Murry Kaplan, who owned the Peek-
A-Boo Bookstore, one of more than 250 adult bookstores in Los
Angeles, was convicted of selling an unillustrated paperback
novel suggestively entitled Suite 69. Since the book contained
no pictures the petitioner urged that the written word could not
under any circumstances be considered legally obscene. The
Court disagreed, deciding that this historic form of expression
enjoyed no absolute immunity.
D. United States v. Orito34
In United States v. Orito, George Joseph Orito was indicted
for importing numerous reels of film claimed by the government
to be obscene. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin dismissed the indictment on the ground that 18 United
31 The Court, in a faltering opinion which ignored the report of the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, stated:
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial
behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite
reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist.
413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
321d. at 59-60.
33413 U.S. 115 (1973).
34413 U.S. 139 (1978).
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States Code § 1462 was unconstitutionally broad because it failed
to distinguish between public and nonpublic transportation.
Orito had the distinction of being twice argued before the
Supreme Court because of the troublesome issues presented.
However, the Court finally concluded that commerce in obscene
materials was unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of
privacy and, thus, remanded the case to the district court.
E. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film65
Claimant Paladini sought to import through Los Angeles cer-
tain motion picture films from Mexico which he insisted were
for his own private use. The customs officers, however, seized
,these films because they were obscene under the authority of 19
United States Code § 1305(a) which prohibits the importation
of any obscene or immoral materials.
The District Court for the Southern District of California
dismissed the government's complaint, relying upon United States
v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,36 which held the statute uncon-
stitutional. Acknowledging that the decision had been reversed,37
the Court nevertheless heard the case because "the narrow issue
directly presented in this case, and not in Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, is whether the United States may constitutionally prohibit
importation of obscene material which the importer claims is for
private, personal use and possession only."
38
In his petition to the Supreme Court Paladini used the Stanley
argument, urging that the right to possess obscene material in
the privacy of one's home created the implied right to import it
from another country for private use. However, the Supreme
Court rejected this contention and reasoned that:
This overlooks the explicity narrow and precisely delineated
privacy right on which Stanley rests.
We are not disposed to extend the precise, carefully limited
holding of Stanley to permit importation of admittedly ob-
scene materials simply because they are imported for private
use only.39
35 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
36 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
37 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
38 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
39 Id. at 127-28.
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With this synopsis of the cases, we turn now to a discussion
of the major rules of law which have thus emerged.
VI. Tim Miller MANI-ESTO
In Miller the court drastically changed the formula for judging
obscenity by declaring:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
40
The Court concluded that for an obscenity statute to be con-
stitutional it must specifically define the sexual depiction sought
to be disallowed. The Roth test for evaluating obscenity was
discarded because it was too vague for defendants to understand
and impossible for prosecutors to implement.41 Accordingly, the
Court recognized that in light of the new Miller standards of
obscenity the gravest "constitutional doubts" are raised regarding
the existing statutes.
42
Under these new guidelines most state obscenity statutes are
patently unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court issued the clearest
possible directive to state legislatures by stressing:
State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must
be carefully limited .... As a result, we now confine the per-
missible scope of such regulation to works which depict or
40413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
41 In Miller the Court stressed:
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the California
Penal Code ... approximately incorporates the three-stage Memoirs test,
supra. But now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by
its author and no member of the Court today supports the Memoirs
formulation.
id. at 23.
The Court emphasized that states must formulate standards more concrete than
those of the-past:
We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice
to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may
bring prosecution.
Id. at 27.42 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 180
n.7 (1973).
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describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically
defined by the applicable state law, as written or authorita-
tively construed.
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be sub-
ject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene ma-
terials unless these materials depict or describe patently of-
fensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law, as written or construed.43
Courts in Arizona,44 California,45 Indiana,46 Iowa,4" Louisiana,48
Massachusetts,49 New Jersey,50 and North Carolina' have already
struck down those states' obscenity statutes because they lack
the requisite degree of specificity.
However, in United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm
Film, in a most significant footnote, the Court suggested:
We further note that, while we must leave to state courts the
construction of state legislation, we do have a duty to au-
thoritatively construe federal statutes where "a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised . . ." and "a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided." United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 369, 91 S. Ct. 1400, 1404, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (opinion
of White, J.), quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). If and when such
"serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness of the words
"obscene", "lewd", 'lascivious", "filthy", "indecent", or "im-
moral' as used to describe regulated material in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1462 ... we are prepared to con-
4 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14, 23-24, 27 (1973) (emphasis added).44 Rife v. Purcell, Civil No. 73-480 (D. Ariz., filed Aug. 17 1973).
4r People v. Bloom, No. A 282 816 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, July 6,
1978); but see, People v. Enskat, Crim. 22506 (Court of Appeals, Second Ap-
pellate District, August 8, 1973).4 6 Mohney v. Indiana, 276 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. 1971); and Stroud v. Indiana,
273 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. 1971). See Stroud v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 911 (1973);
Mohney v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 911 (1973). In both Stroud and Mohney the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and merely remanded the cases for further con-
sideration in light of Miller.
17 State v. Cahill, No. IM2-261 (Linn County, Iowa, Aug. 13, 1973); City of
Fargo v. Wolfe (Municipal Court, Cass County, N. Dak., Aug. 9, 1973).
48 Giarrusso v. Excalibor Books, Inc., No. 557-753 (New Orleans, La., July 13,
1973).
40 Literature Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372 (1st Cir. 1973).
5 0Hamar Theaters, Inc. v. Cryan, 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2449 (D. N.J. July 26,
1973).
51 State v. Bracken, 72 CR 26502 and State v. Cox, 72 CR 26503 (Super. Ct.,
Greensboro, N.C.).
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strue such terms as limiting regulated material to patently
offensive representations or descriptions of that specific "hard-
core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.
. . . Of course, Congress could always define other specific
"hard-core" conduct.52
A. Implementing Miller: A Task for the Legislatures
The now famous "footnote 7" has become an oasis for prosecu-
tors across the nation striving to redeem vague obscenity statutes
by asking courts to construe them in keeping with the Miller
mandate. Several courts have undertaken that hazardous task
and have rescued state obscenity provisions by a strained judicial
construction in accordance with Miller.
5 3
It is indeed a dangerous venture for courts to perform open
heart surgery on these ailing obscenity laws which fail to par-
ticularize the forms of sexual depiction sought to be suppressed.
Such an ambitious undertaking ignores completely a legion of
cases forbidding this form of judicial legislation.5 4 There are
indeed a number of reasons why courts should not become
embroiled in the dangerous business of redrafting obscenity laws.
Recognizing that the states are free to adopt a less inclusive
definition of obscenity, the Supreme Court pointed out in Miller:
"We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory
schemes for the States. That must await their concrete legislative
efforts."55 And, with respect to the scope of those "regulatory
schemes," the Court added in Paris Adult Theatre that:
It should be clear from the outset that we do not undertake
to tell the States what they must do, but rather to define the
area in which they may chart their own courses in dealing
with obscene material.56
Under the authority of Miller, state legislatures have the
choice of adopting any of a number of definitions of obscenity.
52413 U.S. 123, 180 n.7 (1973).
53 See, e.g., People v. Enskat, Crim. 22506 (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 8, 1973),
where the court construed the California statute to meet Miller standards. Ap-
plication for certiorari to the Supreme Court of California is pending.
54 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
In each of these cases the court declared the statute unconstitutional without at-
tempting to cure the statute's affliction through redrafting.
55 413 U.S. 15,25 (1973).
56 413 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1973).
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They may choose to include the Miller examples, or they may
follow the course taken by such states as Arizona and Hawaii,
which have chosen to abandon adult censorship.er Lawmakers
likewise may decide to retain the redeeming social value test in
its original form rather than accept the Supreme Court's modifica-
tion of ".... serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
Given the many constitutional options for redefining obscenity
laws, the choice must appropriately be made by the legislatures
and not the courts.
A second reason for judicial abstention concerns the ancient
doctrine of nulla poena sine lege, which provides that there can
be no punishment without a specific law defining the conduct
to be avoided. Although courts are regularly called upon to
construe statutes in determining their compatibility with relevant
constitutional principles, they are not authorized to rewrite the
law. That power rests exclusively with the legislature. When a
court undertakes this difficult task, it does so without the benefit
of the fact-finding machinery and experience normally possessed
by legislators. The judiciary is further disadvantaged because of
its inability to determine whether certain proscriptions will be
effective or easily administered.
Finally, courts are handicapped because they cannot tell
whether the judicial construction will be compatible with un-
formulated legislative policies.5 8 Thus, courts should not attempt
to define criminal liability when the legislatures have failed to
speak on that subject with precision. A court's attempted speci-
fication of the varied forms of proscribed sexual description will
5 7 Legislatures may decide to permit depictions of natural sex, but disallow
depictions of abnormal sex. They may elect to forbid depictions of oral and
anal intercourse, masturbation and excretory functions, but allow the lewd
exhibition of genitals or ultimate sex acts either actual or simulated.
Since the portrayal of natural sex would not appeal to anyone's prurient
interest, legislatures may elect to only forbid well defined sexual abnormalities such
as bestiality, pedophelia, sadism, masochism, or sado-masochism, to name only a
fev.
58 The New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to rewrite statutes
which have overrun the borders of the first amendment. See People v. Berck, 300
N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973), cert. denied, New York v. Berck, 14
L. Rptr. 4115 (12/10/73), declaring unconstitutional a loitering statute; People
v. The Bookcase, Inc., 201 N.E.2d 14, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964), declaring un-
constitutional § 484-h of the New York Penal Law which forbade the sale of
obscene books to minors as being overly broad; Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462
(1968); People v. Bunis, 172 N.E.2d 273, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961), holding un-
constitutional § 436-d of the New York Penal Law forbidding the sale of books
with part of their covers removed.
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surely spill out in all directions and cannot be penned up within
the confines of a single decision. What is needed throughout
the country are new laws, structured along the lines designated
by Miller, which must be forged in the fires of the legislatures.
While a legislative solution clearly should be preferred to judicial
rescue attempts, this certainly does not imply that the task will
be easy or the result satisfying.
B. Miller: An Inflexible Standard
There is a terrible leak in the Miller decision through which
most of its logic escapes. The newly contrived requirement that
an obscenity statute specify every form of proscribed sexual
portrayal endangers the other two branches of the Roth equation
which required that the material appeal to the average person's
prurient interest and that it be patently offensive. For example,
a state statute forbidding the depiction of cunnilingus by impli-
cation decrees that this form of description violates contemporary
community standards and appeals to a person's prurient interest.
Absent any serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value,
it is proscribable. Thus, the critical important ingredients of
prurient appeal and community approval are disabled.
The constitutional purpose of the community standards test
is to allow the publication of sexual expressions which have
acquired a degree of community tolerance. On the other hand,
the prurient appeal test is designed to screen out only those
sexual depictions which inspire a morbid or shameful interest in
sex as contrasted with a normal or healthy appeal. Both these
standards are flexible and will vary with changes in a society's
sexual permissiveness. A statute which rigidly forbids a par-
ticular form of sexual description impairs these sensitive testing
procedures designed to mobilize the judging process. Thus, the
wrecking of Roth by the codification of offensive sexuality will
prove to be a terrible misjudgment because the genius of the
Roth rule is in its flexibility. It could, for example, expand for the
Tropic of Cancer and constrict and condemn hard-core pornog-
raphic pictures. The Court's desire to simplify the management
of obscenity by strict and detailed statutes is understandable
but ill-advised. Not only will this form of legislation debase the
first amendment, but it is bound to generate even more litigation
in this troublesome field.
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VII. PROOF OF OBSCENITY
Perhaps the most disappointing procedural aspect of the
Court's recent obscenity decisions was the holding that the
prosecution need produce no proof bearing on the issue of
obscenity 9 In an extended and unbroken series of cases it has
been held postulate that in any criminal prosecution evidence
must be offered to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every element of the crime charged. ° Even in the simplest
bookmaking case or narcotics prosecution the government must
come forward with evidence, expert or otherwise, to show that
the slips of paper seized or the chemical substance confiscated
is the contraband proscribed by the statute. This well-settled
rule of law had been applied in obscenity prosecutions in an
overwhelming majority of the cases. For that matter, our courts
have traditionally held that since pornography prosecutions always
involve first amendment considerations they require even more
stringent adherence to procedural safguards.6'
State and federal courts had concluded that the prosecution
must produce some proof that the challenged work appeals to
the average person's prurient interest, is patently offensive and
is utterly without redeeming social value.(2 Against this mountain
5OKaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973).6 0 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
(1949); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Wilson v. United States,
232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910);
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432 (1895); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).6
1Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 277-80, 283-88 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
62 United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v.
Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169, 1174 n.7 (8th Cir. 1968); Luros v. United States, 389
F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp.
36 (D.C. Cal. 1970); City of Phoenix v. Fine, 420 P.2d 26 (Ariz. 1966); In re
Giannini and Iser 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968); People v. Rosakos,
74 Cal. Rptr. 34 (Ct. App. 1966); Hudson v. United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C.
1967); Dunn v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 213 A.2d 751 (Md. 1965);
Keuper v. Wilson, 268 A.2d 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970); Newark v. Humphres,
228 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967); Ramirez v. State, 430 P.2d 826 (Okla.
1967); Commonwealth v. Lalonde, 288 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1972); Commonwealth v.
Dell Publications, Inc., 233 A.2d 840 (Pa. 1967); House v. Commonwealth 169
S.E.2d 572 (Va. 1969).
As a practical matter, federal prosecutors have produced some form of proof
of obscenity in a large number of major prosecutions throughout the country.
(Continued on next page)
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of authority, only two cases had held such proof unnecessary."3
This entire line of cases requiring proof of obscenity was
obliterated by the Supreme Court's decisions of June 21, 1973.
The Court, struggling with the social science of pornography,
stated in the Paris Adult Theatre case:
This is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of
expert testimony. Such testimony is usually admitted for the
purpose of explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could
not understand. Cf. Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), §§ 556,
559. No such assistance is needed by jurors in obscenity
cases; indeed the "expert witness" practices employed in these
cases have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound
concept of expert testimony.64
However, the Court did carve out a narrow exception to this
rule by emphasizing:
We reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not
presented here, where contested materials are directed at
such a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the
trier-of-fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether
the material appeals to the prurient interest. [Citing authori-
ties.] 65
The Court graciously acknowledged the right of the defense
to provide expert proof establishing the non-obscene nature of
the material charged. As a practical matter, if it is expected that
the defense will produce such proof, the prosecution may be
forced to call expert witnesses to meet the impact of the defen-
dant's evidence.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
United States v. Ewing, 445 P.2d -345 (10th Cir. 1971), remanded in light of
Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); United States v. I Am Curious-Yellow, 404 F.2d 196
(2 Cir. 1968); United States v. Thevis, 329 F. Supp. 265 (M.D. Fla. 1971),
appeal pending, No. 71-2614 (5th Cir.); United States v. Connoisseur Publica-
tions, Indictment No. 68-319 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United States v. London Press,
Indictment No. (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Reed Enterprises, In-
dictment No. (S.D. Cal. 1971), (prosecution of the report of the Pres-
ident's Commisson on Obscenity and Pornography); United States v. Pattern of
Evil, Civ. No. 69-2157 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). What all these cases have in common is
that the prosecution must as in any other case, produce some proof to establish
its claim that the materiaf charged is obscene.
63 United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc recon-
sideration); United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
64 413 U.S. at 56 n.6.
65 Id.
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The consequences of the Paris decision could be shattering.
Failure to provide any proof on the essential elements of obscenity
is an open invitation for jurors to confuse personal distaste with
prurient appeal. It also encourages jurors to become puritanical
and to suppress materials without any objective basis.
The Second Circuit, in its enormously influential decision of
United States v. Klaw,66 pointed this out in unmistakable language
by declaring:
. .. it would be altogether too easy for any prosecutor to stand
before a jury, display the exhibits involved, and merely ask
in summation: "would you want your son or daughter to see
or read this stuff?" A conviction in every instance would be
virtually assured.67
Unless there be this protection, a witch hunt might well come
to pass which would make the Salem tragedy fade into ob-
scurity.68
It is unrealistic to assume that 12 jurors in any community in
this country will know whether a given work appeals to a person's
prurient interest (a shameful or morbid interest in sex) or exceeds
the national or state contemporary community standards. And
in a great many cases jurors must have some guidance concerning
whether a publication or film has serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. The elimination of the need for any proof
on the issue of obscenity (except the publication itself) is bound
to launch juries on a rampage of legal sorcery that, in the words
of Klaw, may put the Salem witch trials to shame.
VIII. ELusIwE CoMmUNI STAmABo s
In 1964 the Supreme Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio,69 in a
plurality opinion, decided that the term "contemporary com-
munity standard" meant a national standard. A minority of the
Court argued that since the Federal Constitution was being con-
strued a national standard had to be applied. Otherwise, a book
found legal in New York City could be illegal in Fargo, North
Dakota, because of obvious differences in community standards.
6 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
67 Id. at 170.
68 Id.
69 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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The argument that the first amendment could not be geo-
graphically compartmentalized seemed sensible. However, this
well-grounded rule also was capsized by the Court's recent rulings.
In Miller the Court decreed:
We hold the requirement that the jury evaluate the materials
with reference to "contemporary standards of the State of
California" serves this protective purpose and is constitu-
tionally adequate. 70
Elsewhere in the opinion the Court emphasized:
People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes,
and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity.71
Obscene material may be validly regulated by a State in the
exercise of its traditional local power to protect the general
welfare of its population despite some possible incidental
effect on the flow of such materials across state lines.72
In the Paris Adult Theatre case, the Court specifically noted:
... we are called upon to reconcile the right of the Nation and
of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other
hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in
accordance with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 73
Since the Miller opinion is dominated by discussion of a state-
wide standard, it is hoped the community used to judge books
and motion pictures will be at least that large. Nowhere in the
opinion does the Court say that the contemporary community
could be restricted to that of a village, town, city or even county.
Common sense dictates that a state prosecution should be based
on a state-wide standard.
74
70 413 U.S. at 33.
71 Id.
72413 U.S. at 32, n.13.
73 413 U.S. 60 n.10, quoting from former Chief Justice Warrens dissenting
opinion in Jacobells v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 199.
74 On the remand of Heller v. New York, the New York Court of Appeals
held that "in determining whether any material is patently offensive or obscene,
the community standard to be applied is a 'state standard." People v. Heller, 352
N.Y.S.2d 601, 608 (1973).
Significantly, Chief Justice Burger, who authored the Miller opinion, had
earlier urged that a state-wide standard should be applied. See Hoyt v. Minnesota,
399 U.S. 524 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970).
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The Court left open the question of whether a local con-
temporary community standard should apply to a federal prosecu-
tion. Although United States v. Orito and United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film7 5 were remanded so that the
lower courts could apply the newly devised Miller standards,
this does not mean that local standards should apply in federal
prosecutions. Logic dictates that where there is a prosecution
under a federal statute which covers all 50 states, the equal
protection clause and basic concepts of federalism mandate the
use of a national standard.
76
In a significant footnote the Court discussed the use of a
"national" standard. The Court there suggested that the problems
manifest in the use of a state-wide standard in a state prosecution
will also apply to the use of a national standard in a federal
prosecution. It emphasized:
The use of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies
that materials found tolerable in some places, but not under
the "national" criteria, will nevertheless be unavailable where
they are acceptable. Thus, in terms of danger to free ex-
75 413 U.S. 123 (1973).7 6For instance, § 1461 of Title 18 makes criminal the mailing of obscene
matter anywhere in the United States. A prosecution under that section may be
initiated in the district where the mailing is received or in the district where it
originated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1970). Since the community standard by
which the publication is judged forms an essential element of the crime, a
national standard is constitutionally necessary for consistent application of each
of the criminal elements of the offense.
If any other standard but a national one were applicable to federal prosecutions
the parade of horrors that would follow in the path of such a policy would be
endless. A few convincing illustrations point up the grave dangers in such a plan:
Two distributors in San Francisco (distributors A and B) both send the
same publication to a recipient in Sioux City, Iowa. Nothing would pre-
vent the government from prosecuting distributor A in San Francisco and
distributor B in Sioux City. Using local community standards, distributor
A would probably be convicted in Sioux City. Whereas, the distributor
prosecuted in San Francisco would probably be acquitted. The difference
in these dispositions, unlike disparate results in criminal prosecutions due
to differing views of jurors, must be attributed to a constitutionally
impermissible alteration of an element of the crime.
Another alarming example involves the publisher of a book who mails
copies into the 50 states (certainly not unusual) or, for that matter, 94
federal districts. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b), the government could
prosecute the defendant in the district most favorable to it by reason of
unusually high community standards. This is not merely a matter of
forum shopping, which the government frequently does in other cases,
but involves a substantive change in an essential ingredient of the crime,
i.e., the community standards branch of the newly-devised Miller test.
Under such a rule the right of equal protection of ihe law would be left
in a shambles.
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pression, the potential for suppression seems at least as great
in the application of a single nationwide standard as in al-
lowing distribution in accordance with local tastes, a point
which Justice Harlan often emphasized. 77
This language means that the use of state and national stan-
dards will inevitably involve some degree of suppression. Under
a national standard, a film acceptable by New York City standards
may still be condemned in a federal prosecution in that city
because the national standard may be based upon a considerably
lower level of tolerance for sexually explicit materials than
existing in this community. Surely the better rule is the use of
a state-wide standard for state prosecutions and a nation-wide
standard for federal actions. However, despite the compelling
logic favoring this rule, several federal courts have decided that
the appropriate community from which to establish the standard
in a federal prosecution is the judicial district in which the case
is tried. 7
8
The Fifth Circuit, deeply divided in a controversial en banc
opinion, has reached the opposite conclusion by the narrowest
margin. 79 The majority in an 8-7 vote adhered to the need for a
national standard.80 Thus, Groner authorizes the use of a national
standard in a federal obscenity prosecution.
77 413 U.S. at 32 n.13.
78 United States v. Pinkus, No. 1144-DW-CD (C.D. Cal., July 16, 1973);
United States v. Wassermen, No. A-72-Cr-71 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 1973); United
States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, No. 73-Civ.-1341 (S.D.N.Y.,
August 17, 1973).
United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973).
80 judge Clark joined Chief Judge Brown and Judges Thornberry, Wisdom,
Goldberg, Godbold, Simpson and Morgan in holding:
Despite the considerable doubts about the use of wholly artificial
national standards which were inartfully expressed in my former con-
currence and which I still entertain, further study certainly indicates that
Judge Thornberry's panel opinion may be correct in speculating that a
national standard test should be applicable. The crime charged here is
not only an interstate offense against the national sovereign, but one which
can be prosecuted in any one of many districts in many states under the
venue provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b). The difficulty of choosing,
instructing on, and applying some local standard in such a situation is
apparent.
United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d at 588 n.2.
When Mr. Justice Rehnquist was an Assistant Attorney General with the Depart-
ment of Justice, he testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary concern-
ing proposed anti-obscenity legislation designated H.R. 5171, 11009, 11031, and
11032 and stated:
Yet, when you are talking about a federal statute that is enacted to cover
(.Continued on next page)
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Admittedly, Groner was decided before Miller. However, a
serious question exists as to the geographical limits of the "com-
munity" in federal cases, even after Miller. In United States v.
Palladino8' the First Circuit considered this question and came
to the conclusion that the Miller decision applied only to state
prosecutions:
The Court, in dealing with federal statutes, made it clear
that the elements of obscenity which it spelled out for states
also applied to federal statutes, but stopped short of applying
to federal statutes its holding as to community standards in
evaluating those elements.... Nevertheless, the Court mani-
fested its wider skepticism [sic] as to national standards for all
purposes by referring to the concept as "hypothetical and un-
ascertainable".
While the path of gracious acceptance of its role by an
inferior court might be seen as that of applying the dictum and
strongly expressed feeling of the Supreme Court to the federal
statute before us, we think the step is not one to be taken
without an explicit holding from that Court.8 2
This courageous decision was based upon the sound logic
that federal venue provisions would create grave constitutional
questions if applied to federal obscenity prosecutions in which
the "community" was less than national.83 Citing what is referred
to as the "vice of selective prosecution" the court catalogued the
possibilities and steadfastly refused to depart from past pre-
cedent, logic and common sense.
IX. THE WRUMrN WoRn
The sweeping action of the Supreme Court in overturning
convictions involving over 34 paperback novels on June 12, 1967,
under the authority of Redrup,84 left publishers with the in-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
all 50 states, I think you have to pretty well come to the conclusion that
as far as the federal statute is concerned it has to be a nation-wide stan-
dard. . . . I think states, to the extent that the Constitution permits
them, are certainly not required to adhere to a national standard in their
own dealings with literature for minors. But that I think for the federal
government to try to adopt in its statute a state-by-state or community-by-
community standard would be unworkable. (Hearings before Subcommit-
tee No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Congress, at 37,
46; emphasis added).
81490 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1974).
82 490 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
83 Id. See also notes 76 and 80 supra.
8 4 See note 22 supra.
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escapable impression that the printed word was constitutionally
protected. Under this deluge of decisions, which covered every
conceivable kind of writing, lawyers were led to believe that any
story about people and places, no matter how frankly it described
their sexual experiences, had some redeeming social value and
thus was immune from criminal prosecution.
However, in Kaplan v. California5 this very thesis dominated
the petitioner's contentions. 6 Seeming to apologize for its con-
clusions, the Court turned its back on Kaplan's claims stating:
Because of a profound commitment to protecting communica-
tion of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the
printed word or in speech stimulates a traditional and emo-
tional response, unlike the response to obscene pictures of
flagrant human conduct. A book seems to have a different
and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it
should be. But this generalization, like so many, is qualified
by the book's content. As with pictures, paintings, drawings,
and engravings, both oral utterances and the printed word,
have First Amendment protection until they collide with the
long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not pro-
tected by the Constitution.87
The consequences of Kaplan can be terrifying. Whether we
approve or disapprove of these novels, they reflect the tenor of
our times. Under our concept of first amendment freedoms the
choice of what books a person may read in the privacy of his
own home for his amusement or enlightenment must be left to
the individual and not the community or the government. The
suggestion is shocking that the state should attempt to regulate an
individual's thoughts, and yet by censoring unillustrated books
which may nourish a reader's sexual fantasies, the government in
every respect controls his thoughts.
The Court had earlier said:
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.
Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society
85413 U.S. 115 (1973).
86 The Court defined the issue as "whether expression by words alone can
be legally 'obscene' in the sense of being unprotected by the First Amendment."
413 U.S. at 118.
87413 U.S. at 119, 120.
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in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection
of free speech as the best of literature.88
In a word, the most skillful or artistic writers hold no special
franchise to the first amendment's freedom of expression. Thus
the marginal works must be protected if the objectives of the first
amendment are to be fulfilled.
Kaplan may well lead to the criminal exile of a large mass of
literature to which the American public should have access if
they so desire. The ultimate danger to a free people lies not
so much in the elimination from the marketplace of a handful of
paperback novels which some may define as trash, but rather
in the fear such action will instill in writers, possibly staying
their pens from writing words of some value to society, and in
the invitation to judge for someone else what is or is not "trash."
X. LACK OF FAIR WARNING
In remanding more than 60 cases which had jammed its docket
at the time of Miller the Supreme Court created a serious problem
of retroactivity. Basic due process requires that a penal statute
give fair warning of the conduct to be avoided.8 9 Understandably,
the notice must exist before the commission of the alleged
offense." In abandoning the Roth-Fanny Hill test the Court
made it clear that it was setting forth a new and precise standard
for determing what material comes within the purview of the
term "obscene." It would also seem that in rejecting the past
standards, the Court intended the newly created judicial test for
prospective application only. In announcing the constitutional
requirement of "fair warning" the Court stated:
We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide
fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and
commercial activities may bring prosecution.91
Due process, in the area of first amendment rights, requires
"reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt" to guide the trier
88 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
89 Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); UnitedStates v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).90 Watlns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957).
91413 U.S. at 27.
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of facts.92 When a trial is had under legal standards which are
ambiguous and unascertainable, the effect is to "license the jury
to create its own standard in each case."93 It should also be noted
that the retroactive application of the new standards announced
in Miller would be comparable to ex post facto legislation, and
such retroactive judicial construction has been specifically con-
demned as contrary to the due process provisions of the Federal
Constitution."4
Predicting what the various state and federal courts will do
with these remanded cases is hazardous, but it would seem that
any conviction prior to June 21, 1973 cannot be retroactively
sustained. Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals, judicially
construing an obscenity statute which did not specify the forms
of sexual conduct sought to be proscribed, by the most deceptive
sleight of hand constitutionalized it and allowed it to be retro-
actively applied.9 5 Since New York's judgment may be followed
by other courts, some discussion of the history of the New York
rule is needed to understand that recent decision.
XI. NEw YoRK HARD-CopE PoRNoaApriy TEST
During the decade in which the obscenity debate was raging
in the United States Supreme Court, the New York Court of
Appeals, perhaps more than any other court, was also plagued
with this controversial subject. However, in 1961 the Court of
Appeals, in a daring decision, concluded that under New York's
obscenity statute, only "hard-core" pornography could be officially
banned consistent with first amendment principles. 8 This de-
cision was applauded in academic circles and favorably cited on
at least two occasions by the United States Supreme Court.9"
In defining "hard-core pornography" the Court stated that:
It [hard-core pornography] focuses predominantly upon what
is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre, without any
92 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 (1972);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Herndon v. Lowry, 303 U.S. 242,
264 (1937).
93 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).94 Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964).
95 People v. Heller, 307 N.E.2d 805, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1973).
96 People v. Richmond County News, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369
(1961).9 7 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) and Manual Enterprises v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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artistic or scientific purpose or justification. Recognizable
"by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the human
spirit"..., it is to be differentiated from the bawdy and the
ribald. Depicting dirt for dirt's sake, the obscene is the vile,
rather than the coarse, the blow to sense, not merely to
sensibility. It smacks, at times, of fantasy and unreality, of
sexual perversion and sickness and represents, according to
one thoughtful scholar, "a debauchery of the sexual faculty."",
It was felt that the hard-core pornography test was a precise
and workable standard for assessing obscenity. By creating a test
that "may be applied objectively," the more difficult subjective
judgments involved in Roth were avoided. The test simply ac-
cepted, as a matter of law, an assumption that a certain category
of photographic material may be proscribed as violating minimum
standards by being too foul or revolting. Absent any redemming
social value, such material is unprotected. The test directed the
court's attention to the material itself and avoided the difficulty
of trying to assess the pendency of its appeal or impact upon
some hypothetical person's prurient interest. However, the New
York Court of Appeals never particularized any "specifically
defined sexual conduct" proscribed under the "hard-core pro-
nography" test, as now required by Miller.
A year after the Richmond County News case a majority of
the court of appeals concluded that two paperback books were
obscene under the hard-core pornography test but still declined
to define that epithet.9 But, by the time People v. Fritch00
reached the court, serious disagreement had developed among
its members about the meaning of "hard-core pornography."
Four judges found Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer obscene
while Judges Fuld, Dye and Van Voorhis registered furious
dissents. A year later the United States Supreme Court found
the Tropic of Cancer to be constitutionally protected. 01
In 1965 the court of appeals again dramatically divided over
the legal suitability of the novel Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure
by John Cleland. In Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons,10 2 that court,
98 175 N.E.2d at 686, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
99 People v. Finkelstein, 183 N.E.2d 661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1962).
100 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
101 Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
102 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1964).
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by the margin of one vote, held that classic legally acceptable.
It was immediately apparent, however, that the hard-core
pornography doctrine was beginning to fall into disrepair,
because in 1965 the same court found obscene four paperback
books entitled Lustime, Strumpet, Call Boy, and Sin Merchant,
which contained no four-letter words or pictures.
10 3
Within six short years of its inception the hard-core pornog-
raph test was barely recognizable.' In People v. G.L Distribu-
tors, Inc.,'05 a paperback book with photographs of young men
in various stages of undress engaged in attitudes of "embracing,
wrestling, spanking," was found to be pornographic by the
court. Chief Judge Fuld in the lone dissent complained about
the defacing of the hard-core pornography formula fashioned
under his leadership. 10
By 1969 the hard-core pornography test had reached its
lowest ebb. In that year the court found obscene two innocuous
girlie magazines entitled Candid and Hefty, which contained
photographs of semi-nude women and a number of respectable
stories. 0 7 None of the photographs in these magazines portrayed
any sexual activities, and the women photographed were not
fully nude nor were their genital areas exposed. Again, the
Supreme Court was compelled to reverse the New York court's
findings under their much older and more restricted Roth test. 08
As plainly revealed by these cases, the term "hard-core
pornography," although well-intentioned, worked no better than
other elusive terms such as "obscene," "lewd," or "patently
offensive." These generic terms lack specificity and, consequently,
are not functional in assessing obscenity. However, in 1967 the
103 People v. Matherson, 208 N.E.2d 180, 260 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1965).
104 In 1966 the court denied leave to appeal in People v. Friedman, and People
v. Avansino, where lower courts found obscene, photosets of girls posed in the nude
without any exposure of the genitalia. The Supreme Court was forced to reverse
both these judgements under the Roth-Memoirs test. Friedman v. New York, 888
U.S. 441 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 888 U.S. 446 (1967).
105 228 N.E.2d 787, 281 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1967).
106 Judge Fuld exclaimed:
But, in point of fact, there is neither indecent exposure nor portrayal of
a consummated lewd act; indeed, the photographs are no worse than the
magazine pictures of female models which we have previously held not to
be pornographic.
228 N.E.2d at 790.
10 7 People v. Carlos, 248 N.E.2d 924, 301 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1969).
' 08 Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969).
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New York legislature stepped into the breach and revised the
state's obscenity statute. The New York lawmakers brazenly
discarded the New York Court of Appeals' hard-core pornography
test and adopted the federal Roth definition of obscenity. 0 9 To
the surprise of many and the disappointment of some, New York's
highest court, whose membership had dramatically changed
since 1961, yielded to the legislature and embraced the Roth
test as incorporated in Section 285 of the New York Revised
Penal Law." 0 The Richmond County News case, which had re-
ceived national acclaim ten years before, was abandoned by
the New York Court of Appeals and slipped slowly below the
surface as lost precedent.
With the collapse of the hard-core pornography test in New
York, pandemonium broke out in the lower courts as trial judges
fumbled uncertainly for a judicial pathway out of the swamp of
obscenity law. A judge in Rochester found magazines identical
to those held constitutionally protected in New York City"' to
be obscene." 2 The search warrant in the Rochester case author-
ized the seizure of magazines with pictures of nude persons
which "exposed the female and male genital organs, the female
and male pubic areas, including the male penis and the female
breasts." The Court of Appeals understandably reversed the
109 Section 235.00 provides in part:
Any material or performance is obscene if (a) considered as a whole its
predominant interest is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in
nudity sex, excretion, sadism or masochism and (b) it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such mat-
ters, and (c) it is utterly without redemming social value.
The legislators deliberately turned their back on their courts hard-core pornography
test recognizing full well that it was far less stringent than the federal standards.
See McKinneys Penal Law, Book 39, Part 2, Practice Commentary p. 89.
110 People v. Heller, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971). In that case
the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Bergan, held:
The elements which must be established to satisfy the constitutional pro-
tection afforded by the First Amendment to freedom of expression as
laid down by Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1
L.Ed.2d 1498 are established in this prosecution. The statute itselt
meets the Roth standards (Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289
[2d Cir. 1970]).
Those elements justifying prosecution by the State and meeting Federal
constitutional requirements are that the dominant theme of the produc-
tion as a whole appeals to prurient interest in sex; is patently offensive
as an affront to community standards; and is without redeeming social
value.
Id. at 653, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
111 People v. Stabile, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1969).
112 People v. Abronovitz, 310 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Monroe Co. Ct., 1970).
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judgment and dismissed the indictment, although on fourth
amendment grounds.1
Judge Arthur Goldberg of the New York City Criminal Court
found the play Che obscene because simulated acts of intercourse
were performed on stage.' 4 At the same time the play 0! Cal-
cutta!, in which naked actors and actresses romped about the
stage and committed simulated sexual acts, ran undisturbed both
on and off Broadway, and the film I Am Curious-Yellow, with
explicit scenes of sexual intercourse, sodomy and castration,
survived prosecution in the Second Circuit.1 3 These decisions
illustrate the utter chaos that occupied this province of the law.
The remand of Heller held out the promise of bringing
order to all this confusion. Unfortunately, that hope was dashed
on December 28, 1973 when the New York Court of Appeals, in a
4-8 decision, defied Miller's dictate and held that:
Despite all their rhetoric, the practical tests for obscenity
insofar as this Court has always applied them, have undergone
no change in light of the Miller decision. Unless the Legisla-
ture amends the statute, as it is free to do, our tests will con-
tinue to be what they have been."(
Thus, the majority of the court unfortunately rejected the "con-
crete guidelines" of Miller designed to eliminate the subjectivity
of the New York test. Therefore, the Heller case is but another
decision in the ever lengthening catalogue of cases that have
added to the confusion in this troubled area of the law. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court's continued intervention in this un-
settled region of the law is required.
XII. SAICrI AND SEIZURE DECISIONS
Three days after the June 21st decisions the Supreme Court
decided three cases dealing with police procedures used in
seizing obscene materials or enjoining their distribution." 7 Forty-
three years ago the Supreme Court had cautioned that any prior
113 People v. Abronovitz, 286 N.E.2d 721, 335 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1972).
114 People v. Bercowitz, 808 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1970).
"11 United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled I Am Curious- Yellow," 404
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
116 People v. Heller, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971).
"7 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483 (1973); Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 36 (1973).
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restraint on the dissemination of any form of speech constitutes
an infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially
condemned.""
Since then, only in the most extreme cases has the Court
approved any prior restraint on the distribution of films or
books. Even in the most exceptional cases, where some form
of prior restraint might be permissible, the Court declared the
restraint itself bears "a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity."" 9 Thus, it was clear under these authorities
that states were not free to adopt arbitrary procedures in the
enforcement of their obscenity laws.
A. The Adversary Hearing
In an attempt to fix certain ground rules for the two warring
American constituencies-those who sell sexy books and those
who would regulate what the rest of society may read-the Su-
preme Court devised the prior adversary hearing. In Marcus v.
Search Warrants,120 and Quantity of Books v. Kansas,' decided
back to back, the Supreme Court dictated that before any
restraint can be imposed on the distribution of first amendment
materials an adversary hearing to determine the legal propriety
of the challenged work must be conducted before seizure. This
principle is deeply woven into the fabric of the first amendment.
Marcus and Quantity of Books have spawned a mass of authority
holding that an adversary hearing is a constitutional predicate
for the seizure of books or motion picture films. 22
118 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
119 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
120 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
321 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
122 United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Gir. 1970); Demich, Inc.
v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Calm,
416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Tyrone, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th
Cir. 1968); Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967); Mod Amusement Co.
v. Murphy, 335 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. Jan-
uary 12, 1974); United States v. 50 Magazines 323 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1971); Job-
bor Cinema, Ltd. v. Sedita, 309 F. Supp. 868 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) Morrison v. Wilson,
307 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306
F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Central Agency Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502
(N.D. Ga 1969) Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Huskey, 805 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D.N.C.
1969); Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc. v. Rizzo, 305 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969); Gundlach v. Rauhauser,
304 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Delta Books Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304
F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga.
1969); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex. 1969); Gregory v. DiFloria,
(Continued on next page)
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The purpose of an adversary hearing intelligently conducted
before the seizure of presumptively protected books or films is
manifest. It provides a superior means of deciding the com-
plicated issue of probable cause in an obscenity case where
that decision must be made on the basis of a large volume of facts
and law. Although the adversary proceeding will not magically
eliminate all error, it will reduce substantially the incidence of
misjudgment by guarding against the possibility that the magis-
trate, through a lack of familiarity with materials previously held
to be not obscene, will make a hasty or ill-considered decision
as to whether the books or films being criminally investigated
should be seized.
As a practical matter, the adversary hearing has been used
as a means of displaying to the judicial officer similar publications
found not obscene in high appellate courts. Once the magistrate
is familiar with the material held not obscene by other respectable
courts, he is in a much better position to decide whether or
not the warrant should issue. When adversary hearings are
ignored by the state, magistrates very often issue warrants for
the seizure of books previously determined to be not obscene. 23
Police abuse in this area has been rampant. Often unnoticed
by courts is the high incidence of police seizures and the inex-
cusable impounding of books for long periods of time. More
often than not these materials are eventually returned to the
distributor or are found not obscene.
124
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
298 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D.N.Y. 1969); Whilbelm v. Turner, 298 F. Supp. 1335
(S.D. Iowa 1969); City News Center, Inc., v. Carson, 298 F. Supp. 705 (M.D.
Fla. 1969); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1966);
Evergreen Review, Inc. v. Kahn, 230 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
123 See People v. Abronovitz, 310 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1970), where
it was discovered after the seizure that three of the publications had been previously
adjudicated not obscene in other courts.
124 People v. Loar, No. C-26732 (Orange Co. Super. Ct., Cal.) [22,500 reels
of film and 30,000 photographs]; People v. Parker, No. A270-417 (Los Angeles Co.
Super. Ct., Dept. 116, Cal., Feb. 1972) [99 reels of film]; Raro, Inc. v. Goodman,
No. 72-781 (S.D. Fla., August 15, 1972) [entire inventory of store including 4,000
boo,-s and magazines]; For Adults Only Inc. v. State, No. 717412 (Dade Co. Cir.
Ct. Fla.) [192 books, 900 magazines, 32 reels of film and 79 newspapers]; People v.
Tannahill (Madison Co., Ill., Oct. 1971) [1,500 magazines]; People v. Ward
(Peoria City Cir. Ct., Ill., Sept. 1970) [400 magazines]; People v. Smith
(Champagne Co. Cir. Ct., Ill., July 1970) [1,000 magazines]; Commonwealth v.
Comette, Nos. 13768-13770 (Campbell Co. Cir. Ct., Ky.) [defendants entire
inventory including business records and cash seized without search warrants on
each of three days]; State v. Bryant (Greensboro Super. Ct. & Dist. Ct., N.C.)
[4,000 magazines and reels of film]; State v. Johnson, No. 10451 (Franklin Co.
(Continued on next page)
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It bears repeating that these "search and destroy" missions
conducted by the police, which overrun the borders of the first
amendment, are a serious threat to a free society. All that guards
the frontiers of this important amendment against such assaults
is the adversary hearing which must be surmounted by these
hostile forces before free expression can be suppressed by the
state.
These ill-considered and unauthorized seizures have also in-
flamed federal-state relations since litigants must often resort to
federal courts in order to enforce their constitutional rights under
§ 1983 of Title 42.125 It was against this legal backdrop that the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide Heller v. New York.12
B. Heller v. New York: The Blue Movie
In 1968 Andy Warhol produced a motion picture called The
Blue Movie. 27 The film was unique, to say the least, in that it
contained no credits, no formal ending, and merely consisted of
a man and woman in a small apartment apparently obsessed with
trying a strange variety of sexual experiments.
Two New York City police officers observed the film being
shown in the Garrick Theater on Bleeker Street in Greenwich
Village and subsequently secured a search warrant without an
adversary hearing. The film was seized, and a criminal prosecu-
tion was launched against the exhibitor, Saul Heller. The trial
court summarily rejected the defense contention regarding a
prior adversary hearing, and at the moment the seeds of a major
constitutional controversy became deeply embedded in the case.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Mun. Ct., Ohio) [1,441 books and magazines]; State v. Barnett, Nos. 831, 1209,
1210 (Hamilton Co. Mun. Ct., Ohio) [54 magazines, 8 reels of film and 8
projectors]; State v. Sooner State News Agency, No. CRIF 71-1957 (Tulsa Co.
Dist. Ct., Okla) [$18,000 worth of books and magazines]; State ex rel. Keely v.
Spracker, No. 380-311 (Mil. Co. Cir. Ct., Wis.) [500 paperback books, 2,000
magazines and 15 reels of film]; State ex rel. Nemoc v. Staffens, No. 380-118 (Mil.
Co., Wis.); and In re Search Warrant for Best Buys Co., No. 42-2-A (LaCrosse Co.,
Wis.) [500 books, 1,000 magazines and 100 reels of film]. Cf. Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483 (1973).
12 5 Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969); Tyrone
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202
(7th Cir. 1968); Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
126413 U.S. 483 (1973).
127 The film's original title was to be a four-letter word commonly used to
describe human copulation. However, eventually the name The Blue Movie was
substituted, presumably to make the film's advertising more socially acceptable.
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The trial court found the film obscene, and the appellate term
affirmed the defendant's conviction. 128 The New York Court of
Appeals, obviously offended by the film, concluded that, under
the circumstances of this case, no adversary hearing was neces-
sary
29
The United States Supreme Court decided that the procedures
used in seizing Heller's film were constitutionally adequate since
only a single film was confiscated for evidentiary purposes. Thus,
under the narrow circumstances of this case, the Court concluded
that no adversary hearing was necessary. The Court emphasized:
If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a de-
termination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and,
following the seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the
obscenity issues in an adversary proceeding is available at the
request of any interested party, the seizure is constitutionally
permissible.130
Nevertheless, the Court was careful to point out:
In this case, of course, the film was not subjected to any form
of "final restraint," in the sense of being enjoined from ex-
hibition or threatened with destruction. A copy of the film
was temporarily detained in order to preserve it as evidence.
There has been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the
film precluded its continued exhibition. Nor, in this case, did
temporary restraint in itself "become a form of censorship,"
even making the doubtful assumption that no other copies
of the film existed.131
Significantly, the Supreme Court galvanized its earlier ruling
governing massive seizures originally announced in the landmark
case of Quantity of Books and Marcus. The Court, striking anvil
blows, proclaimed:
Those cases [Quantity of Books and Marcus] concerned the
seizure of large quantities of books for the sole purpose of
their destruction, and this Court held that, in those circum-
128 The Honorable William E. Ringel, presiding *ustice, Honorable Bernard
Moldow and Honorable Morton Tolleris of the Criminal Court of the City of New
York. The decision of the trial court is unreported.
29 People v. Heller, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971). Chief
Judge Fuld and Judge Gibson, both now retired, dissented.
130 413 U.S. at 489.
131 Id. at 487. (Emphasis in original).
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stances, a prior judicial determination of obscenity in an
adversary proceeding was required to avoid "danger of
abridgement of the right of the public in a free society to
unobstructed circulation of non-obscene books." Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, supra, 378 U.S. at 213, 84 S. Ct. at
1727 (1964). We do not disturb this holding. Courts will
scrutinize any large-scale seizure of books, films, or other ma-
terials presumptively protected under the First Amendment
to be certain that the requirements of Quantity of Copies of
Books and Marcus are fully met. "Any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."1
32
Thus, the Court in Heller extended the life expectancy of
the adversary hearing rule relative to permanent restraints. Under
Heller, the decision whether or not an adversary hearing must
precede a police seizure of books or films depends directly upon
the purpose of the taking. For instance, when the state seeks to
prosecute a person criminally for the distribution of obscene ma-
terials, it may make a limited seizure of the challenged matter for
evidentiary purposes without a prior adversary hearing. Under
those circumstances there is a minimal interference with the dis-
tribution of the questioned work to the public; the determination
of obscenity can await either a post-seizure hearing or the trial
itself.133
If the state's objective is to destroy all of a distributor's films,
however, or to enjoin their distribution, thereby totally abridging
the given work's circulation, a pre-seizure determination of
obscenity is constitutionally required. This well-defined principle
is reinforced by another statement in Heller:
But seizing films to destroy them or to block their distribution
or exhibition is a very different matter from seizing a single
copy of a film for the bona fide purpose of preserving it as
evidence in a criminal proceeding, particularly where, as here,
there is no showing or pretrial claim that the seizure of the
copy prevented continuing exhibition of the film.'
3 4
132 Id. at 488. (Emphasis added).
'
3 3 For that matter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, using great foresight,
anticipated the coming of this rule in Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289
(2d Cir. 1970) and United States v. Wilde, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
134 418 U.S. at 488-89.
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When the state or federal governments seeks to stop com-
pletely the showing of a film or the distribution of books, whether
it be for a few hours or a few days, such a paralyzing restraint must
be preceded by an adversary hearing under Heller. The Supreme
Court's rule requiring a prior adversary hearing under those cir-
cumstances has never been relaxed; to the contarary, the validity
of that rule has been strengthened by Heller. It would be a ser-
ious insult to the scholarship of the United States Supreme Court
to suggest that the showing of a film could completely and perman-
ently be interrupted without an adversary hearing. The Supreme
Court's continued preoccupation with avoiding total restraints of
any kind is reflected in the following language from Heller:
... on a showing to the trial court that other copies of the
film are not available to the exhibitor, the court should permit
the seized film to be copied so that showing can be con-
tinued pending a judicial determination of the obscenity issue
in an adversary proceeding. Otherwise, the film must be
returned. 3 5
Compliance with the constitutional requirement of an ad-
versary hearing imposes no real burden on the state because it
in no way interferes with the criminal prosecution. On the other
hand, if the state promptly proceeds with an adversary de-
termination and a court concludes the materials are obscene,
then their further distribution may be properly enjoined. An
even-handed application of this reasonable rule will stop police
from terrorizing book distributors by the taking of all of their
merchandise and thus imposing upon them a Carthaginian peace.
At the same time it will allow quixotic prosecutors to continue
to joust at this country's ever-turning windmill of sexual materials
thought by them to be socially unacceptable.
C. Roaden v. Kentucky'36
In Pulaski County, Kentucky, a sheriff watched the film Cindy
and Donna at a local drive-in theater. After he finished viewing
the film, he arrested the theater manager for exhibiting an obscene
motion picture in violation of Kentucky's obscenity law. The
arrest was based solely on the sheriff's observation of the film with-
135 Id. at 489.
136 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
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out judicial investigation of the issue of obscenity. The case was
successfully prosecuted through the Kentucky courts and even-
tually reached the docket of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court, following its own precedent in Lee Art Theater v.
Virginia,137 distinguished the seizure of guns or stolen goods, as
instruments of crime incidental to an arrest, from first amendment
materials. It declared:
Seizing a film, then being exhibited to the general public,
presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the
seizure of all books in a bookstore. Such precipitous action
by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally
sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is,
in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amend-
ment standards. The seizure is unreasonable, not simply
because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but
rather because prior restraint of the right of expression,
whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the
evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the bookstore or
the commercial theater, each presumptively under the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirements because we examine what is
"unreasonable" in light of the values of freedom of expres-
sion.138
Thus, under Roaden a police officer may not seize, without a
warrant incidental to an arrest, any first amendment materials.
A prior judicial determination of obscenity is a necessary pre-
requisite to such a seizure.
Finally, in Alexandria v. Virginia,3 9 the Court in a per curiam
opinion held that a jury trial is not constitutionally required in
a state civil obscenity forfeiture proceeding. This decision con-
forms to the prevailing practice in most jurisdictions, although
very little has ever been written on it.
In asserting the damage done to the first amendment by the
June 21st decisions, it appears that the procedural province
emerged with fewer casualties. The greatest losses were suffered
in the substantive sectors. The adversary hearing survived this
deluge and was only incapacitated to the limited extent of seizures
137 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
138413 U.S. at 501.
139413 U.S. 836 (1973).
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for evidentiary purposes. We can expect that the seizure of
first amendment materials will continue to constitute a con-
stitutional zone carefully patrolled by the Supreme Court.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court obscenity decisions were deeply
disappointing to those committed to a legal philosophy favoring
greater freedom in what the American people may read and see.
In deciding these cases, the Court has undeniably sown dragon's
teeth in the once fertile soil of the first amendment. A likely
result is that prosecutions will spring up that are bound to
strangle many worthwhile films and books. Certainly Georgia's
successful prosecution of the critically acclaimed film Carnal
Knowledge is foreboding.140
However, we must never lose hope that the day will come
in this country when the witchcraft of pornography will no
longer be feared. For obscenity breeds and multiplies in the dark
crevices of a frightened society preoccupied with a sense of
self-censorship. Once pornography is exposed to the strong sun-
light of a completely free and uninhibited people its appeal will
surely diminish. And if that assumption proves to be wrong,
then we must live with the level and variety of tastes which the
marketplace theory of the first amendment encourages and
protects.
Those who believe that this country's new breed of writers
and film-makers should have their mouths washed out with soap
for using four-letter words as shock weapons in their war on
social complacency must remember that no one is compelled
either to read or see what is repulsive to him. If the law sup-
pressed that which sizable minorities in our society disliked, our
cultural store would be sparsely stocked.
The prevalence in our society today of blue movies, smut
books, peep shows, underground newspapers and live sex shows
is distressing to many, but this phenomenon apparently proves
that a nation gets the kind of art and entertainment it wants and
140 Publishers Weekly, July 23, 1973, at 48, col. 2. Paper Moon also found
obscene in Albany, Georgia-N.Y. Times, August 21, 1973, at 38; the criminal
prosecution of Last Tango in Paris was threatened in Albany, New York, by Dis-
trict Attorney Arnold Proskin; The Devil in Miss Jones was found obscene in Rich-
mond, Virginia by a state court-Variety, August 23, 1973, at 7; to name only a few.
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is willing to pay for. The President's Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography, produced by the largest task force of social
scientists ever assembled to study the influence of obscenity on
people, concluded that hard-core pornography does not cause an
increase in sexual crimes or alter the direction of sexual desires.1
4
1
It is regrettable that many of our political leaders have disavowed
the findings of this remarkable study merely because the con-
clusions it reached were unpopular.
The control of obscenity must be left to the self-regulating
forces of the public's taste. Gresham's law has never prevailed
in the world of entertainment; that is, the bad does not drive
out the good. More importantly, the choice of what books
people will read or what films they will see for their own amuse-
ment, education or enlightenment must be left to them and not
to the government. The right to read and see what we choose
must today include every book, film, magazine and newspaper, or
in the long-run it may include none.
Under a democratic system, it is imperative that all new and
unconventional ideas, no matter how offensive, be heard in order
that we may discover the few that will be truly enlightening.
History has taught us that the main restraining force on official
misconduct is a free and independent press, which, of course,
includes books, films, and underground newspapers. The exposure
of the dreadful Watergate episode, which has convulsed this
nation and drenched the White House in shame, is but one
dramatic example. Although the uncovering of political espionage
affects a wider range of public interest, the social commentaries
evident in Last Tango in Paris and The Love Machine are also of
value to some of us. Consequently, those who may be said to
dwell on the dark side of the first amendment, selling so-called
"dirty" books and making second-rate movies, must be protected
if first-rate books and films are to remain safe. It is not for
public officials to cleanse public debate or to act as arbiters of
taste. The currency of contemporary thought must include
dissent, rebellion, revolution, hedonism, libertinism, and anti-
authoritarianism if our constitutional heritage of freedom is to
survive. When our government posts guards among us to watch
141 PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, TASK FoRcE
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over our morals, we must then ask ourselves the question put to
the Romans by Juvenal 2,000 years ago-"But who will guard the
guards themselves?" 142
142 Satire VI, 347.
